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Abstract
We assess the quantitative implications of the re-use of collateral on financial market leverage,
volatility, and welfare within an infinite-horizon asset-pricing model with heterogeneous agents. In
our model, the ability of agents to re-use frees up collateral that can be used to back more trans-
actions. Re-use thus contributes to the build-up of leverage and significantly increases volatility in
financial markets. When introducing limits on re-use, we find that volatility is strictly decreasing
as these limits become tighter, yet the impact on welfare is non-monotone. In the model, allowing
for some re-use can improve welfare as it enables agents to share risk more effectively. Allowing re-
use beyond intermediate levels, however, can lead to excessive leverage and lower welfare. So the
analysis in this paper provides a rationale for limiting, yet not banning, re-use in financial markets.
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1 Introduction
Re-use and re-hypothecation of collateral has become a major activity in financial markets. It refers
to the practice of financial institutions to use collateral received in one transaction for another
transaction.1 Global collateral re-use at the onset of the financial crisis was estimated to be up to
US $6.6 trillion, and dropping to US $3.4 trillion at the end of 2010, see Singh (2011).2 While market
participants have stressed the importance of re-use of collateral as a source of funding and market
liquidity more generally, regulators and supervisors have raised various concerns about this market
practice. For example, the Vice-President of the ECB, Vı´tor Constaˆncio, has stressed that “activities
of re-hypothecation and re-use of securities amplified the creation of chains of inside liquidity and
higher leverage”.3 Moreover, the Financial Stability Board (FSB) has recently publishes work that
analyzes the financial stability implications of collateral re-use (see FSB (2017a)). Furthermore,
several regulatory frameworks already foresee specific rules like limits and transparency requirements
for re-use of (non-cash) collateral. For example, European retail investment funds (UCITs) are
banned from re-using non-cash collateral. Moreover, the EU framework for margin requirements
for non-centrally cleared derivatives foresees a ban of re-use of non-cash collateral that is posted as
initial margin. Given the importance of collateral re-use in financial markets and the need to inform
the ongoing regulatory initiatives, it is important to develop a model framework to understand the
(quantitative) implications of collateral re-use on financial market outcomes and welfare.
Building on Brumm et al. (2015), we develop an infinite-horizon asset-pricing model with het-
erogeneous agents that allows us to assess the quantitative implications of re-use on financial market
leverage, volatility, and welfare. In our model, the ability of agents to re-use frees up collateral that
can be used to back more transactions. Through this channel, re-use of collateral contributes to the
build-up of leverage and is found to significantly increase volatility in financial markets. When we
introduce limits on the amount of collateral that agents may re-use, we find that volatility is strictly
decreasing in the tightness of the re-use limit. While the effect of re-use limits on volatility is mono-
tone, the impact on welfare is not. In the model, allowing for some re-use can improve welfare as it
enables agents to share risks more effectively. Allowing re-use beyond intermediate levels, however,
can lead to excessive leverage and lower welfare. Thus, the analysis in this paper provides a rationale
for limiting, yet not banning, re-use in financial markets.
In the economic model, financial securities are only traded if the promised payments associated
with selling these securities are backed by collateral. The amount of collateral needed to back a
1Institutions typically receive collateral in securities financing transactions (SFTs, e.g., reverse repo, securities lend-
ing/borrowing) or derivative transactions, and if eligible for re-use, may post it as collateral in other transactions (e.g.,
for repos, securities lending/borrowing, derivatives collateral) or use if for short sales. Re-hypothecation typically refers
to the use of client assets to obtain funding as to finance client activities and is considered as a subset of re-use activity.
2In a related and more recent study, Kirk et al. (2014) document that three large US dealer banks have a strong
dependency on re-use of collateral for financing their activities, estimating their total amount of collateral re-use to be
approx. US $1.3 trillion at end-2013.
3V. Constaˆncio, Beyond traditional banking: a new credit system coming out of the shadows, Speech, University of
Frankfurt, 17 October 2014.
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transaction is determined in equilibrium. Re-use of collateral is introduced by allowing agents who
receive securities as collateral to sell these securities to other agents. As a consequence, the security
can again be used to collateralize transactions allowing agents to further build up their leveraged
position in the risky security. To generate collateralized borrowing in equilibrium we assume that
there are two types of agents who differ in risk aversion and in their beliefs about the growth
potential of the economy and the risky assets.4 These agents have Epstein–Zin utility with identical
intertemporal elasticity of substitution (IES) parameters and identical time discount factors. The
agent with the low risk aversion parameter (agent 1) and optimistic beliefs is the natural buyer of
risky assets and takes up leverage to finance these investments. The agent with the high risk aversion
(agent 2) and pessimistic beliefs has a strong desire to insure against bad shocks and is thus willing
to buy bonds thereby providing financing to the other agent. Growth rates in the economy reflect
the possibility of disaster shocks as in Barro and Jin (2011). When the economy is hit by a bad
shock, the leveraged agent 1 loses financial wealth. As a result, the collateral constraint forces him
to reduce consumption and to sell risky assets to the risk-averse agent. These actions trigger an
additional decrease in asset prices, which further reduces the wealth of agent 1—thereby reinforcing
the impact of the bad shock.
Introducing re-use of collateral into the model significantly increases volatility. More collateral
becomes available in financial markets, allowing agents to build up leverage beyond what is feasible
in a situation where no re-use of collateral is possible. As a consequence, introducing re-use limits
constrains this build-up of leverage, and as the impact of negative shocks becomes less severe, volatil-
ity drops. In our welfare analysis, where we consider unanticipated changes in regulation, we find
that intermediate levels of re-use limits are welfare optimal: Compared to very loose or very strict
regulation, the welfare of one agents is increased when transfers are chosen such that the other agent’s
welfare is kept constant; in some cases we even observe Pareto improvements. The relation between
re-use limits and welfare is non-monotone because two counteracting forces are at play: First, the
ability to re-use allows for more risk-sharing in the economy. This is generally beneficial for welfare
given the agent’s heterogeneity in risk aversion. Second, the heterogeneity in agents’ beliefs triggers
agents to build up leveraged positions beyond what is needed to optimally share risks. As the ability
to re-use collateral allows agents to build up this leverage, limiting re-use has the potential to steer
agents’ choices towards socially optimal levels.
There is a growing policy and academic literature on the role of re-use and re-hypothecation
in financial markets. Singh and Aitken (2010), Singh (2011) and Kirk et al. (2014) use publicly
available data to estimate the amount of collateral re-use in financial markets. Bottazzi et al. (2012),
Andolfatto et al. (2015), Maurin (2015), and Gottardi et al. (2015) present theoretical models of
collateral re-use. In particular, Bottazzi et al. (2012) provides a general theory of re-use in repo
markets whereas Andolfatto et al. (2015) show how re-use may benefit the provision of liquidity in
financial markets. Maurin (2015) focuses on the role of re-use in completing markets, whereas Got-
tardi et al. (2015) discuss how re-use may impact collateral constraints and haircuts. Furthermore,
4We assume that agents (agree to) disagree about the probability distribution of the growth rates. The agents’ beliefs
deviate from the objective probabilities in opposite directions, agent 1 being optimistic and agent 2 being pessimistic.
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Infante (2014) and Eren (2014) present models that consider the funding role of re-use for dealer
banks. Eren (2014) shows how re-use may expose hedge fund to a dealer’s default, whereas Infante
(2014) considers how collateral runs may arise due to re-use. However, none of these papers provide
a quantitative analysis of the implications of re-use on aggregate financial market outcomes. Fur-
thermore, with the exception of Andolfatto et al. (2015), who discuss limits on re-use in the context
of monetary policy and inflation and find that limits need to be stricter in economies with lower
inflation or a lower rate of return on securities, none of these papers focusses on the implications of
regulating re-use.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 provides an overview of industry
practices for collateral re-use. In Section 3 we describe our economic model and its benchmark
parametrization. Section 4 presents numerical results for the impact of re-use on leverage and
volatility in the benchmark economy. In Section 5 we examine the welfare implications of re-use
limits. Section 6 concludes. The Appendix contains additional proofs.
2 An overview of collateral re-use practices
Since the academic literature on the re-use of collateral is still very young, we begin with a brief
description of re-use in industry practice. For this purpose, we first define the terms re-use and re-
hypothecation. Next we provide some figures on the size of global re-use activities. Then we discuss
some regulatory concerns about the effects of collateral re-use on the stability of financial markets.
We complete our introduction with a look at recent initiatives at international level assessing financial
stability risks and benefits associated with collateral re-use.
2.1 Defining re-use of collateral
The Financial Stability Board (FSB) defines collateral re-use in a broad sense as “any use of assets
delivered as collateral in a transaction by an intermediary or other collateral taker”, see FSB (2017b).
Financial institutions receive collateral in securities financing transactions (SFTs, e.g., reverse repo,
securities lending/borrowing) or derivative transactions. Depending on the terms of the transaction,
the collateral may be eligible for re-use by the receiving counterparty: they can use it for their own
purposes (e.g., for repos, securities lending/borrowing, short sales, derivatives collateral). For exam-
ple, in a repurchase transaction (repo), the counterparty providing cash (i.e. the collateral taker) can
re-use the securities obtained as collateral to, among other things, pledge as collateral in a separate
transaction with a third party. Often, the term “collateral re-use” is used interchangeably with the
term “re-hypothecation”. Again, we follow FSB (2017b) where re-hypothecation is defined narrowly
as “any use by a financial intermediary of client assets”. We therefore consider re-hypothecation as
a subset of the broad collateral re-use concept. In a typical re-hypothecation transaction, securities
that serve as collateral for a secured borrowing (e.g., a margin loan extended to a hedge fund) are
further used by the intermediary to obtain funding for the initial transaction.
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2.2 The relevance of collateral re-use in financial markets
Re-use of collateral has become a major activity in financial markets, and is a common practice
across many entities in the financial system. Though incomplete data makes it difficult at this
junction to pin down the exact size of global collateral re-use activity, publicly available data on
collateral re-use activity of globally active banks indicates that collateral re-use plays an important
role in financial markets.5 Figure V displays the evolution of re-use activity for a set of 13 global
banks. The level of collateral re-use amongst the 13 global banks amounted to around 3.8 trillion
euro and approximately 30% of total assets of these financial institutions before the crisis. The time
Figure I: Collateral Re-use
Own calculations based on 13 banks’ annual reports. The institutions are Deutsche Bank, Societe Generale, BNP
Paribas, Credit Suisse, UBS, Barclays, RBS, HSBC, Nomura, Morgan Stanley, Goldman Sachs, JPMorgan Chase &
Co., Citi. The figure shows collateral re-use in billion Euros and the ratio of the values of re-used collateral and total
assets.
series further reveals that collateral re-use exhibits strong pro-cyclicality. The most striking fact
appearing in the data is the sharp contraction in collateral re-use taking place during the global
financial crisis, in 2008. Thereafter, the amount of collateral re-used by financial institutions has
risen again, however, without returning to pre-crisis levels.
Figure II reports the evolution of the average re-use rate for the set of 13 global banks. The re-use
rate is defined as re-used collateral divided by collateral received that is eligible for re-use. The re-use
rate reflects banks’ intensity of re-use. Even during the financial crisis 2007–09, the average re-use
rate remained above 70%.
5See Singh (2014) for a similar exercise using a different methodology.
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Figure II: Collateral Re-use Rate
Own calculations based on 13 banks’ annual reports. The institutions are Deutsche Bank, Societe Generale, BNP
Paribas, Credit Suisse, UBS, Barclays, RBS, HSBC, Nomura, Morgan Stanley, Goldman Sachs, JPMorgan Chase &
Co., Citi. The figure shows the proportion of re-used collateral relative to the collateral received that is eligible for
re-use.
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2.3 Financial stability risks associated with collateral re-use
While market participants have stressed the importance of re-use of collateral as a source of funding
and market liquidity more generally, regulators and supervisors have raised various concerns about
this market practice. For example, the same piece of collateral may be used to back a chain of
transactions and may therefore contribute to system-wide leverage. This concern has, for example,
been raised by Vice-President of the ECB, Vı´tor Constaˆncio, who stressed that “activities of re-
hypothecation and re-use of securities amplified the creation of chains of inside liquidity and higher
leverage”.6 More specifically, the use of the same security as underlying collateral for different
transactions increases the sum of exposures in the financial system and, and as result, creates leverage
across the intermediation chain. The evidence presented in Figures V and II suggests that re-use
practices may be significant drivers of financial system leverage. The apparent cyclical behavior of
aggregate re-use activities suggests that re-use may also contribute to pro-cyclicality in the financial
sector. In good times, market participants tend to be more willing to allow counterparties to re-use
the collateral, increasing market liquidity and lowering the cost of capital. However, in stressed
market conditions, market participants become more sensitive to counterparty risk and hence, may
refuse the re-use of their collateral, amplifying strains already present in markets (see also FSB
(2017b)). Moreover, FSB (2017b) highlights the issue of interconnectedness arising from chains of
transactions involving the re-use of collateral. Large exposures amongst financial institutions create
a risk of contagion, though it is acknowledged that securities financing transactions usually involve
small net exposures because of daily margining. Nevertheless, the unwinding of a transaction by
one institution may trigger the unwinding of transactions by other institutions, and lead to the
propagation of shocks through the financial system. In the context of re-hypothecation it has been
argued that it creates the possibility of a run on a prime-broker if there are concerns about its credit
worthiness, and therefore clients have an incentive to withdraw their assets from their prime brokers.7
This risk appears, at least to some extent, to have materialized around the failures of Bear Stearns
and Lehman Brothers, where hedge funds moved their assets from their prime brokers. These actions
exacerbated the financing problems faced by the two entities which had relied on the availability of
client assets for the financing of their activities.8
2.4 The regulatory framework and ongoing initiatives
When it comes to the regulatory framework for collateral re-use, it helps to distinguish between
broader re-use of collateral and the narrower set of client asset re-hypothecation. On collateral
re-use more broadly, no general restrictions exist. There are however a few cases where limits or
bans on re-use exist for specific entities or transactions. One example relates to retail investment
6V. Constaˆncio, Beyond traditional banking: a new credit system coming out of the shadows, Speech, University of
Frankfurt, 17 October 2014.
7See Duffie (2010) for an extensive discussion of this issue.
8See Aragon and Strahan (2012) for an analysis of the impact the failure of Lehman Brothers had on its hedge fund
clients.
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funds (UCITS funds) in the EU. The ESMA Guidelines on ETFs and other UCITS issues9 require
that UCITS do not re-use non-cash collateral they receive and set conditions for re-investment of
cash collateral. A second example relates to initial margin posted in OTC derivatives. The EU
regulatory technical standards (RTS) on margin requirements for non-centrally cleared derivatives
foresees that re-use of non-cash collateral collected as initial margin shall not be permitted. Moreover,
the FSB has recently published two papers related to collateral re-use. FSB (2017b) analyzes the
financial stability implications of collateral re-use as well as the benefits of collateral re-use for
financial markets. This paper furthermore describes a number of post-crisis regulatory reforms
related both directly and indirectly to the re-use of collateral and mitigating at least some of the
risks described above. While the FSB sees no need for immediate regulatory action, it considers
that appropriately monitoring collateral re-use at the global level will be an important step towards
obtaining a clearer understanding of global collateral re-use activities. Hence, to enhance monitoring
of global collateral re-use activity, the FSB published a paper that sets out methodology for measuring
non-cash collateral re-use, and describes the related data elements that national authorities would
report to the FSB (see FSB (2017a)). This FSB paper further defines various metrics that could be
used to monitor financial stability risks associated with collateral re-use.
To address financial stability concerns related to re-hypothecation of client assets, the FSB issued
several recommendations in 2013 (see FSB (2013)). These aim at reducing client uncertainty about
the extent to which assets have been re-hypothecated and the treatment in case of bankruptcy,
and at limiting re-hypothecation of client assets (without an offsetting indebtedness) to financial
intermediaries subject to adequate regulation of liquidity risk. Moreover, the FSB recommended
that prime brokers/banks shall use that amount of client assets only that they need for the purpose
of financing client activities, representing an aggregate limit on the amount of client assets they can
re-hypothecate. Without this aggregate limit, prime brokers could in theory use all client assets
eligible for re-hypothecation, including for their own activities and irrespective of the aggregate level
of financing their set of clients requires.
With regard to existing regulatory measures on re-hypothecation, in the EU the recently agreed
Securities Financing Transaction Regulation (SFTR) imposes minimum market-wide conditions to
be met on re-hypothecation of client assets such as prior consent, disclosure of the risks and conse-
quences of re-hypothecation, and transfer of the financial instruments from the account of the client.
Furthermore, in the EU no aggregate nor client-individual limit on the amount of client assets avail-
able for re-hypothecation exists and is instead agreed between the two counterparties. This is in
contrast to US framework where an individual limit of 140% of the clients indebtedness applies, next
to an aggregate limit in line with the aforementioned FSB recommendation. However, specifically to
EU investment funds, custodians of UCITs assets are prohibited from re-using (including, but not
limited to, transferring, pledging, selling and lending) fund’s assets for their own account according
to UCITS funds (see FSB (2017a)).
9See https://www.esma.europa.eu/sites/default/files/library/2015/11/esma-2014-0011-01-00_en_0.pdf.
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3 The Model
This section introduces an infinite-horizon exchange economy with two infinitely lived heterogeneous
agents trading in a Lucas tree and a bond. Both assets can be traded on margin, in which case
collateral needs to be posted. The received collateral can potentially be re-used. Both assets can be
shorted. In case of the Lucas three, naked shorting is not possible, so an agent can only short the
tree if he has received it as collateral. A regulating agency limits the extend to which collateral can
be re-used.
3.1 The Physical Economy
Time is indexed by t = 0, 1, 2, . . . . Exogenous shocks (st) follow a Markov chain with support
S = {1, . . . , S} and transition matrix pi. The evolution of time and shocks in the economy is
represented by an infinite event tree Σ. Each node of the tree, σ ∈ Σ, describes a finite history
of shocks σ = st = (s0, s1, . . . , st) and is also called a date-event. The symbols σ and s
t are used
interchangeably. To indicate that st
′
is a successor of st (or is st itself), write st
′  st. The expression
s−1 refers to the initial conditions of the economy prior to t = 0.
At each date-event σ ∈ Σ, there is a single perishable consumption good. The economy is
populated by H = 2 agents, h ∈ H = {1, 2}. Agent h receives an individual endowment in the
consumption good, eh(σ) > 0, at each node. Agent h believes that the transition matrix of the
Markov chain of exogenous shocks is pih—this matrix may differ from the true transition matrix
pi. There is a single long-lived asset (“Lucas tree”) in the economy, which we also call stock. At
the beginning of period 0, each agent h owns initial holdings θh(s−1) ≥ 0 of this asset. Aggregate
holdings in the long-lived asset sum to one—that is,
∑
h∈H θ
h(s−1) = 1. At date-event σ, agent h’s
(end-of-period) holding of the asset is denoted by θh(σ). The long-lived asset pays positive dividends
d(σ) in units of the consumption good at all date-events. The aggregate endowments in the economy
is then
e¯(σ) = da(σ) +
∑
h∈H
eh(σ).
Agent h has preferences over consumption streams ch =
(
ch(st)
)
st∈Σ representable by the following
recursive utility function, see Epstein and Zin (1989),
Uh
(
ch, st
)
=

[
ch(st)
]ρh
+ β
∑
st+1
pih(st+1|st)
(
Uh(ch, st+1)
)αh
ρh
αh

1
ρh
,
where 1
1−ρh represents the intertemporal elasticity of substitution (IES) and 1− αh the relative risk
aversion of the agent.
3.2 Financial Markets and Collateral
At each date-event, agents can engage in security trading of two assets, long-lived stocks and one-
period bonds. Agent h can buy θh(σ) shares of the long-lived asset at node σ for a price q(σ).
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Importantly, agents can short-sell long-lived assets. We assume that short positions in the long-lived
asset cannot be “naked”, meaning that agents must cover their short sales by having borrowed the
long-lived asset.10 In addition to the long-lived asset, there is a single one-period bond available
for trade; this bond is in zero net supply and its face value is one unit of the consumption good in
the subsequent period. Agent h’s (end-of-period) holding of this bond at date-event σ is denoted
by φh(σ), and the price of the bond at this date-event by p(σ). Agents can also take up debt by
shorting this bond.
The agents can default on short positions in the long-lived asset or the short-lived bond at any
time without any utility penalties or loss of reputation. Therefore, to enter a short position in either
one of the two assets, agents must back up their promised payments by collateral. Since there are
only two assets in the economy, an agent who borrows by assuming a short position in the long-lived
asset must hold a long position in the bond as collateral. And vice versa, an agent who shorts the
bond must hold a long position of the long-lived asset as collateral.
Specifically, if an agent borrows by short-selling the stock, θh(st) < 0, then that agent is required
to hold a sufficient amount of collateral in the bond. The difference between the value of the collateral
holding in the bond, p(st)φh(st) > 0, and the current value of the loan, −q(st)θh(st), is the amount
of capital the agent puts up to obtain the loan. A margin requirement, ms(s
t) ∈ [0, 1], enforces a
lower bound on the value of this capital relative to the value of the collateral,
ms(s
t)
(
p(st)φh(st)
)
≤ q(st)θh(st) + p(st)φh(st). (1)
Similarly, if an agent borrows by short-selling the bond, φh(st) < 0, then that agent is required
to hold a sufficient amount of collateral in the long-lived asset. The difference between the value
of the collateral holding in the long-lived asset, q(st)θh(st) > 0, and the current value of the loan,
−p(st)φh(st), is the amount of capital the agent puts up to obtain the loan. A margin requirement,
ml(s
t) ∈ [0, 1], enforces a lower bound on the value of this capital relative to the value of the collateral,
ml(s
t)
(
q(st)θh(st)
)
≤ q(st)θh(st) + p(st)φh(st). (2)
Since there are no penalties for default, an agent who sold the stock at date-event st defaults on
his or her promise at a successor node st+1 whenever the initial promise exceeds the current value
of the collateral—that is, whenever
−θh(st) (q(st+1) + d(st+1)) > φh(st).
Similarly, an agent who sold the bond at date-event st defaults on his or her promise at a successor
node st+1 whenever the initial promise exceeds the current value of the collateral—that is, whenever
−φh(st) > θh(st) (q(st+1) + d(st+1)) .
In this paper, margin requirements are sufficiently large so that no default occurs in equilibrium and
defaultable bonds are not traded. In Brumm et al. (2015) this restriction is an equilibrium outcome:
10Note that this assumption is in line with short selling regulations in the EU and the US (see, e.g., https://www.esma.
europa.eu/regulation/trading/short-selling)
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following Geanakoplos (1997) and Geanakoplos and Zame (2002), Brumm et al. (2015) assume that,
in principle, bonds with any margin requirement may be traded in equilibrium, yet show that with
moderate default costs only risk-free bonds are traded.
We consider two different rules for the determination of margin requirements. According to the
first rule, financial markets determine margin requirements, ms(s
t) and ml(s
t), that are just large
enough to prevent default in equilibrium. Specifically, for borrowing with the long-lived asset against
the bond, market-determined margin requirements ms(s
t) are the lowest possible margins that still
ensure no default in the subsequent period,
ms(s
t) = 1− q(s
t)
maxst+1 {q(st+1) + d(st+1)} p(st)
.
Substituting this margin requirement into inequality (1) leads to the inequality
−θh(st) max
st+1
{
q(st+1) + d(st+1)
} ≤ φh(st).
Similarly, for borrowing with the bond against the long-lived asset, market-determined margin re-
quirements ml(s
t) are the lowest possible margins that still ensure no default in the subsequent
period,
ml(s
t) = 1− p(s
t) ·minst+1
{
q(st+1) + d(st+1)
}
q(st)
.
Substituting this margin requirement into inequality (2) leads to the inequality
−φh(st) ≤ θh(st) min
st+1
{
q(st+1) + d(st+1)
}
.
This margin requirement makes the bond risk-free by ensuring that a short-seller will never default
on his or her promise.
According to the second rule, a (not further modeled) regulating agency requires debtors to have
a certain minimal amount of capital relative to the value of the collateral they hold. Put differently,
the regulator imposes a floor on margin requirements so that the margin requirements for regulated
assets traded is always the larger of this required minimal level mrs(σ) (or m
r
l (σ)) and the market-
determined margin level ms(σ) (or ml(σ)). If the minimal levels are one, then no asset can be used
as collateral.
3.3 Re-use of Collateral
In our economy, when collateral is posted, the agent receiving it has the right to re-use the collateral
for his own purposes, either using it as collateral for another transaction or (short-)selling it.11 We
denote the amount of collateral received by agent h by θhreceived(s
t), and the amount of collateral
re-used by θhreused(s
t). We furthermore assume that a regulatory agency can set a limit κ(st) ∈ [0, 1]
11In financial markets, a significant amount of collateral is supplied including a transfer of title (e.g., in repo transactions)
that implies that for the length of the transaction the counterparty receiving the collateral becomes the owner of the
collateral. It is, therefore, free to use it as collateral in a different transaction or to sell it.
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on the fraction of the received collateral that can be re-used by agents. This leads to the following
re-use constraint for agent h:
θhreused(s
t) ≤ κ(st) · θhreceived(st). (3)
Note that, given the assumption that naked shorting is ruled out in our framework, allowing for
re-use only renders possible short-sales in the long-lived asset. Setting the re-use parameter ρ(st)
equal to zero would lead to a situation where not only re-use is ruled out but also short selling is
banned completely. Using the collateral constraint (2) and the re-use constraint (3) we can now
determine the maximum short position agents can assume. First of all, we need to determine how
much collateral agent h receives, θhreceived(s
t). The collateral constraint (2) that the other agent, −h,
faces for a short position in the bond dictates how much collateral agent -h has to post and thus how
much agent h receives:
θ−h(st) ≥ p(s
t) ·max{0,−φ−h(st)}
(1−ml(st)) q(st) = θ
h
received(s
t). (4)
The lender, agent h, can reuse a portion ρ(st) of this collateral for his own purposes. If he uses it
for short-selling, we have −θh(st) = θhreused(st). Using (3) and (4), we obtain a lower bound on the
position of agent h in the long-lived asset,
θh(st) ≥ −κ(st)p(s
t) max{0,−φ−h(st)}
(1−ml(st)) q(st) . (5)
Observe that for φ−h(st) < 0 obviously φh(st) > 0; the lower bound is negative and agent h is
permitted to short the long-lived asset. Essentially he sells a portion of the collateral owned by
agent −h but pledged to him. Note that the re-use constraint (5) is also valid for φh(st) ≤ 0 and
then reduces to θh(st) ≥ 0. If the agent does not own collateral in the short-lived bond, then he
cannot short the long-lived asset.
3.4 Financial Markets Equilibrium with Collateral
We are now in the position to formally define a financial markets equilibrium. Equilibrium values of
a variable x are denoted by x¯.
Definition 1 A financial markets equilibrium for an economy with regulated re-use limits, (κ(σ))σ∈Σ,
regulated minimum margins (mrl (σ),m
r
s(σ))σ∈Σ, initial shock s0, and initial asset holdings (θ
h(s−1))h∈H
is a collection of agents’ portfolio holdings and consumption allocations as well as security prices and
margin requirements,
((
θ¯h(σ), φ¯h(σ), c¯h(σ)
)
h∈H ; q¯(σ), p¯(σ); m¯l(σ), m¯s(σ)
)
σ∈Σ
, satisfying the following
conditions:
(1) Markets clear: ∑
h∈H
θ¯h(σ) = 1 and
∑
h∈H
φ¯h(σ) = 0 for all σ ∈ Σ.
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(2) For each agent h, the choices
(
θ¯h(σ), φ¯h(σ), c¯h(σ)
)
solve the agent’s utility maximization problem,
max
θ≥0,φ,c≥0
Uh(c) s.t. for all s
t ∈ Σ
c(st) + θh(st)q¯(st) + φh(st)p¯(st) = eh(st) + φ(st−1) + θh(st−1)
(
q¯(st) + d(st)
)
,
m¯l(s
t)q¯(st)θh(st) ≤ q¯(st)θh(st) + p¯(st)φh(st),
m¯s(s
t)p¯(st)φh(st) ≤ q¯(st)θh(st) + p¯(st)φh(st),
θh(st)q¯(st)
(
1−ml(st)
) ≥ −κ(st) · p¯(st) max{0,−φ¯−h(st)}.
(3) For all st, the margin requirements satisfy
m¯l(s
t) = max
{
mrl (s
t), 1− p¯(s
t) ·minst+1
{
q¯(st+1) + d(st+1
}
q¯(st)
}
,
m¯s(s
t) = max
{
mrs(s
t), 1− q(s
t)
maxst+1 {q(st+1) + d(st+1)} p(st)
}
.
Note that long (or short) margin requirements are called unregulated if the regulated minimum
margin requirement, ml(σ) (or ms(σ)), is equal to zero for all date-events σ ∈ Σ.
3.5 The Calibration
We consider a growth economy with stochastic growth rates. The aggregate endowment at date-event
st grows at the stochastic rate g(st+1) which only depends on the new shock st+1 ∈ S, thus
e¯(st+1)
e¯(st)
= g(st+1)
for all date-events st ∈ Σ. There are four different realizations for g(st). We declare the first to be a
“disaster”. We calibrate the disaster shock based on data from Barro and Ursu´a (2008). A disaster
is defined as a drop in aggregate consumption of more than 15 percent, which has a probability of
0.022 and an average size of 28 percent (see Table 10 in Barro and Ursu´a (2008)). Following Barro
(2009)), we choose transition probabilities such that the four exogenous shocks are i.i.d. The non-
disaster shocks are then calibrated such that their average growth rate is 2 percent and their standard
deviation matches the data on typical business cycle fluctuations which have a standard deviation of
about 2 percent. Table I provides the resulting growth rates and their probabilities. Because of their
respective size, we call these realizations as follows: disaster, recession, normal times, and boom.
Table I: Growth rates and their probabilities
Disaster Recession Normal Times Boom
growth rate g 0.72 0.96 1.02 1.08
probability pi(g) 0.022 0.054 0.870 0.054
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We assume that agents (agree to) disagree about the probability distribution of these growth
rates. The agents’ beliefs deviate from the objective probabilities in opposite directions, agent 1
being optimistic and agent 2 being pessimistic. Agent 1 believes that the probability of a disaster is
only (1− δd) times its objective probability. The remaining probability weight is distributed among
the other growth realizations according to their objective probability weights. In addition, agent
1 underestimates the probability of a recession and overestimates the probability of a boom; these
probabilities are scaled by (1− δn) and (1 + δn), respectively. For the baseline calibration, we choose
δd = δn = 0.4.
We assume that the Lucas tree pays dividends which are, for simplicity, proportional to aggregate
endowments, da(s
t) = de¯(st), d ≥ 0. In our baseline calibration, the dividend share is 10 percent,
i.e. d = 0.10—roughly equal to the value of dividends relative to the total income of stockholders in
the US.
There are H = 2 agents in the economy. Recall that the agents have recursive utility functions
(Epstein and Zin (1989)) with parameters ρh and αh where 1/(1− ρh) is the inter-temporal elasticity
of substitution (IES) and 1− αh determines the relative risk aversion of the agent. Following Barro
(2009) we assume that both agents have an identical IES of 1.5. However, we assume that the two
agents differ in their risk aversion. In the baseline case we set the risk aversion of agent 1 to 2, i.e.
α1 = −1 and the risk aversion of agent 2 to 4, i.e. α2 = −3. We set β = 0.975 to generate a real
interest rate of 1.5 percent for the economy with free re-use (parameter κ(st) = 1).
Both agents h receive the same share of aggregate endowments as individual (labor) income.
We abstract from idiosyncratic income shocks because it is difficult to disentangle idiosyncratic and
aggregate shocks in a model with only two types of agents. Each agent h’s labor income is, then,
given by
eh(st) = 0.5
(
e¯(st)− d(st)) = 0.45e¯(st).
4 The Impact of Re-use on Leverage and Volatility
We begin with a description how introducing the re-use of collateral into our framework affects asset
pricing moments and other key economic variables in the model. For this purpose, we compare the
outcome of an economy where re-use is subject to no constraints (κ = 1) to an economy in which
re-use is banned entirely (κ = 0), and two economies with intermediate levels of re-use (κ = 0.2 and
κ = 0.4). Table II reports simulation statistics for these four economies.12 Throughout the paper
we measure volatility by the standard deviation (STD) over a long horizon. The first set of results
are statistics on market returns and the stock price. Next, the table displays moments for agent
1’s wealth share. And the last two rows of Table II report some average characteristics of the first
agent’s portfolio.
We begin with some simple observations. All eight reported statistics are monotone in the re-use
parameter κ. Both the average excess return and its volatility are increasing while the average risk-
12In fact, the re-use constraint is never binding for values κ ≥ 0.6. And so the simulation statistics in the column for free
re-use (κ = 1) apply for all κ ∈ [0.6, 1].
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Table II: Simulation statistics for the model without re-use and with re-use
no re-use (κ = 0) κ = 0.2 κ = 0.4 free re-use (κ = 1)
mean excess return (in %) 0.32 0.45 0.70 1.1
mean risk-free rate (in %) 2.6 2.3 2.0 1.5
STD risky returns (in %) 4.5 4.7 5.1 6.8
mean stock price 6.3 6.9 7.6 8.4
mean wealth, agent 1 (in %) 34.8 42.5 55.8 74.6
STD wealth, agent 1 (in %) 0.7 1.1 2.0 4.8
mean re-use rate (in %) 0 18.4 36.4 48.7
mean bond holding, agent 1 -4.1 -5.3 -7.0 -8.4
The table reports simulation statistics for our economic model for four different values of the re-use parameter κ. The
abbreviation ‘STD’ stands for ‘standard deviation’.
free rate is decreasing in the re-use parameter. The average stock price is increasing in κ and so the
resulting average stock return is decreasing. The more re-use is permitted in the economy, the larger
are the average and the volatility of the wealth share of agent 1. Not surprisingly, the average re-use
rate, defined as re-used collateral divided by collateral received that is eligible for re-use, increases
strongly with the re-use parameter; agent 1 holds, on average, a much larger short position in the
bond as κ increases.
To obtain a clear understanding of the documented reaction of the simulation statistics in response
to changes in the re-use parameter κ, we next work out the economic mechanism driving the wealth
and asset pricing dynamics in the economy. The agent with the low risk aversion parameter and
optimistic beliefs (agent 1) is the natural buyer of risky assets and takes up leverage to finance these
investments. The agent with the high risk aversion and pessimistic beliefs (agent 2) has a strong
desire to insure against bad shocks and is thus willing to provide financing to the other agent backed
by collateral. This model set-up is clearly visible in the two policy functions in the bottom row
of Figure III. For all possible values of the endogenous state variable (the wealth share of agent
1), agent 1 holds a long position in the risky stock and a short position in the riskless bond. This
portfolio structure is present for all possible values of the re-use parameter. The policy functions also
clearly show the impact of the re-use parameter on the agents’ portfolio positions. In the economy
without re-use (κ = 0) agent 1’s stock position is bounded above by the aggregate supply of one
share. Once his wealth share increases above 0.2, he holds the entire stock; his short position in the
bond is then decreasing in his wealth share. If re-use is permitted, then agent 1’s stock position is
no longer bounded above by the aggregate supply. For positive values of κ, agent 2 can now re-use
the collateral (the stock), which she receives for lending to agent 1 via her bond purchases; that
is, agent 2 sells a portion of the collateral to agent 1. As a result, agent 1’s position now exceeds
the aggregate supply of one share. This agent finances the additional stock purchases with further
borrowing in the bond. Thus, his short position in the bond now becomes much larger than in the
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Figure III: Price and policy functions
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The top row of graphs shows the prices of the stock and the bond as functions of the wealth share of agent 1. The
bottom row displays agent 1’s portfolio holdings as a function of his wealth share.
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economy without re-use.
To understand the non-monotone behavior of the policy functions, we next turn to the constraints
in the agents’ utility maximization problems; two constraints play important roles in equilibrium.
Figure IV displays the slack in the long margin constraint of agent 1 and in the re-use constraint of
agent 2 for the economy without re-use (panel (a)) and for the economy with limited re-use, κ = 0.4
(panel (b)). In the economy without reuse, κ = 0, the re-use constraint (3) becomes a short-selling
Figure IV: Slack in constraints
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(b) κ = 0.4
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The figure shows the slack in the re-use constraint (3) of agent 2 and the long margin constraint (2) of agent 1,
respectively. For κ = 0 agent 1’s re-use constraint (3) reduces to θhreused(s
t) ≤ 0 and so the slack is trivially zero on
the entire state space.
constraint, θ2(st) ≥ 0, and is binding for agent 2, whenever agent 1 holds the entire stock, which is
the case whenever the wealth share of agent 1 exceeds a threshold of about 0.22, see also Figure III.
As agent 1’s wealth share increases for levels above 0.22, he cannot buy more of the stock but only
reduce his debt in the bond. Therefore, his long margin constraint (2) is not binding in this region
of the state space. On the contrary, when agent 1 has a wealth share below the threshold of 0.22,
he buys as much stock as permissible under the long margin constraint (2) and so this constraint is
binding.
In the economy with limited re-use, κ = 0.4, the long margin constraint of agent 1 is binding when
his wealth share is below a threshold of 0.45. In this region of the state space, agent 1 buys as many
shares of the stock as permissible under the long margin constraint (2). For wealth shares above this
threshold, the re-use constraint of agent 2 becomes binding and then agent 1 can no longer increase
his stock holding. As agent 1’s wealth share increases for levels above 0.45, he can only reduce his
debt in the bond, see again the bottom row of Figure III. But then the re-use constraint (3) forces
agent 2 to use less re-use, which, in turn, means that agent 1 must reduce his long stock position
and instead reduce his bond debt even further. Agent 1’s bond holding function in Figure III shows
that it increases steeply in the region above the threshold.
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As a result of the two key constraints, leverage peaks at the wealth share where both constraints
are binding. These threshold points lead to the global minima of agent 1’s bond holding function in
Figure III. As agent 1’s wealth share increases beyond these points, his long position in the stock and
his short position in the bond become decreasing in the endogenous state variable. In light of these
equilibrium portfolios of the two agents, it is clear that both the mean re-use rate and the average
bond positions (in absolute value) of each agent are increasing in the re-use parameter κ, see again
Table II. The observed changes in the equilibrium portfolio functions for increasing values of κ have a
strong impact on the wealth distribution. The less risk-averse and more optimistic agent 1 holds the
dividend-paying stock (most of the time). Both his average stock holding function and the average
excess return are increasing in κ. Therefore, his wealth share is also increasing in κ. Table II reports
that agent 1’s average wealth share grows from about one-third in the economy without re-use to
almost three-quarters in the economy with unlimited re-use.
Next we take a look at equilibrium dynamics. Figure V shows simulated paths of key economic
variables for an economy with unconstrained re-use, κ = 1. Observe that re-use is positive for the
vast majority of periods and agent 1 has considerable debt (via his short position in the bond).
When the economy is now hit by a disaster shock, the leveraged agent 1 loses financial wealth. In
the simulation in Figure V, disaster shocks occurred in periods 22, 33, 69, and 84. Each time agent
1’s wealth share drops dramatically to values well below 0.5. As a result, the long margin constraint
becomes binding and forces him to reduce consumption, to reduce his stock holding, and to reduce
his short position in the bond.
In light of these implication of a negative shock, Table II shows, not surprisingly, that the volatility
of agent 1’s wealth share increases considerably in the re-use parameter κ. Hence, introducing re-use
of collateral into the model leads to significantly larger movements in the wealth distribution of
the economy. More collateral becomes available in financial markets, allowing agents to drastically
increase leverage in comparison to an economy without re-use.
The stock price function, see Figure III, becomes steeper around the average wealth share of
agent 1 as the re-use parameter κ increases. Therefore, the enlarged volatility in the endogenous
state variable now also leads to an increase in the stock price volatility. We observe this effect in
Table II: the standard deviation of the equity excess returns is increasing in κ. Figure VI, which plots
the stock return volatility as a function of the re-use parameter, provides additional information. We
observe that the stock return volatility increases monotonically as the re-use parameter increases.
Once the re-use parameter is reaching a value of about 60%, the re-use constraint is never binding
along simulated equilibrium paths; hence, any further relaxation of the constraint does not affect the
stock’s return volatility.
Finally, we turn to the levels of the asset prices. Table II and Figure III show that not only
the average prices of both assets increase in the re-use parameter κ but that the functions increase,
particularly around the average values of the state variable. At first, particularly the increase in the
stock price as a function of the re-use parameter may appear surprising since with κ also the amount
of available collateral increases. This price increase is a consequence of the increased bond price.
Due to the smaller interest rate the future dividends of the stock become more valuable and so the
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Figure V: Simulated paths of equilibrium quantities
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The figure shows simulated paths of six different equilibrium quantities over 100 periods. Disaster shocks occurred in
periods 22, 33, 69, and 84. The graph on re-use of collateral shows a path of agent 2’s short-position in the stock,
which is identical to max(0, θ1(st)− 1).
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Figure VI: Stock return volatility as a function of the re-use parameter
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The graph shows the volatility of the stock return as a function of the re-use parameter κ.
stock prices increases. There are two reasons for the increase in the bond price. First, increased
re-use results in more risk-sharing for the two agents. In particular, agent 2 can insure herself against
negative shocks much better through much larger holdings of the riskless bond. For example, this
agent’s average stock and bond holdings are (0.02, 4.1) for κ = 0 and (−0.73, 8.4) for κ = 1. For such
more desirable portfolios, agents demand a lower (objective) return. Therefore, the risk free rate falls
from 2.6% to 1.5% and the stock return from 2.9% to 2.6% (despite a higher standard deviation) as
we compare an economy with κ = 0 to one with κ = 1. The lower average return implies, of course,
a higher average price of the risky asset. Second, increased re-use makes the bond more valuable to
agent 2— that is, the bond has an increasing collateral value, see Fostel and Geanakoplos (2008).
This increasing collateral value increases the price of the bond.
5 Welfare Implications of Re-use Limits
Next we analyze the impact of re-use limits on the agents’ welfare. For this, we first have to take
a stand on how to measure welfare in the presence of heterogeneous beliefs. One can take the ex-
treme position that probabilities are part of a mathematical representation of preferences but have
no meaning outside the context of this representation and even question the existence of objective
probabilities. In this case regulation of re-use will always make everybody worse off. On the other
hand, as Gilboa et al. (2014) point out, “Savage’s (1954) derivation of subjective expected utility
maximization takes only preferences between acts as its point of departure, but his development is
compatible with a view of probabilities as ranking events by their likelihood. Similarly, his devel-
opment is consistent with a view of probabilities and utilities as conceptually different. The view
that probabilities are not empty, theoretical constructs runs throughout economics.”There are now
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several alternative definitions of Pareto-optimality under differences in beliefs (see e.g. Brunnermeier
et al. (2014), Gilboa et al. (2014) and the references therein). Following Brunnermeier et al. (2014),
we say that an allocation A is Pareto-better than allocation B if under all beliefs in the convex
hull of agents’ subjective probabilities the allocation makes both agents better off (perhaps after a
redistribution). It turns out that under this interpretation our welfare analysis reveals a startling
and robust result: the impact of tightening the re-use constraint on welfare is non-monotone.
Alternatively, Kondor and Ko¨szegi (2015) consider an asymmetric information environment where
agents are irrational in that they neglect information contained in prices or actions of others. Investors
trade on their signals, neglecting the information content of the actions of others. Following Eyster
and Rabin (2005) they refer to this behavior as “fully cursed”. With this behavior, welfare can simply
be evaluated under the objective probabilities. All agents in the economy aim to know these but they
receive signals that often mislead them. With this interpretation, however, our baseline calibration
seems silly—agents’ beliefs are fixed over time, implying that they always receive the exact same
signal and never realize their mistakes. We provide an alternative calibration where beliefs change
with the exogenous shock which can be interpreted as signals. Under the assumption that agents are
fully cursed we obtain the same welfare effect as in the standard calibration: the impact of tightening
the re-use constraint on welfare is non-monotone and there is an interior level of calibration which
Pareto-dominates all others.
In both exercises we consider unanticipated changes of regulation that occur between two periods.
Our starting point is always the setting where no re-use limits apply, κ = 1. The regulator then
introduces a re-use limit with a specific κ < 1. It is important to note that the change in welfare
depends both on the wealth distribution in the period before the regulatory change and on the
exogenous state in the period when the regulation first applies. The wealth distribution matters
because it affects both the asset prices and agents’ portfolio choices. As we have seen in the previous
section, different levels of the re-use limit imply different price and policy functions. The exogenous
state matters because it may greatly affect the wealth distribution. In light of these observations,
we need to decide for which values of the endogenous and exogenous state we evaluate the change
in welfare. We believe that the most reasonable point of departure are the median of the ergodic
wealth distribution of the unregulated economy and the exogenous state 3, which is the mode of the
distribution of shocks and represents the normal growth state. We refer to this starting point as
the ‘benchmark economy’ in our discussion below. To demonstrate that the choice of starting point
matters only quantitatively but not qualitatively, we also verify that our key results hold for the 10th
and the 90th percentile of the ergodic wealth distribution.
5.1 Rational agents with unknown probabilities
We first examine welfare effects in our baseline calibration. We follow Brunnermeier et al. (2014) in
that we show that regulation can lead to allocations that are Pareto-better under all “reasonable”
beliefs. We begin our analysis with the simpler case where we only use the objective beliefs to
evaluate welfare. It is useful to discuss this case in detail because it makes clear how regulation can
improve welfare. We then turn to the full analysis and evaluate welfare under several beliefs.
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5.1.1 An introductory example
Figure VII plots the welfare effects for agent 2 of an unanticipated change in the re-use regulation
when the welfare for agent 1 is kept constant by means of transfers. The interior maximum is
Figure VII: Welfare changes as a function of the re-use parameter
0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 100
−0.5
0
0.5
1
1.5
2
2.5
3
3.5
Impact on Welfare 
Re−use limit in percent
W
el
fa
re
 C
ha
ng
e 
in
 p
er
ce
nt
 
 
10%−quantile
Mean Wealth
90%−quantile
The solid line shows the welfare change for agent 2 after compensating agent 1 for the impact of the regulatory change
from κ = 1 to the level of κ (in percent) on the horizontal axis. The benchmark economy for the comparison is an
unregulated economy in a time period when agent 1’s wealth is equal to the mean of the ergodic distribution; also,
the economy enters state 3 in the subsequent period. The other two lines report the corresponding welfare changes
for an unregulated economy in a time period when agent 1’s wealth is equal to the 10th and 90th percentile, respectively.
clearly visible. Figure VIII plots the individual welfare changes for the two agents and also reports
the post-compensation change for agent 2 for the benchmark economy. All welfare changes are
exactly zero for κ ∈ [0.6, 1]. For such large values of the re-use parameter, the re-use constraint is
never binding in long simulations. The equilibrium is identical to that for an economy with free
re-use and a changing regulation of κ in this region does not affect equilibrium outcomes. For values
of the re-use parameter in the interval [0.5, 0.6] (approximately), the regulation leads to a Pareto
improvement relative to the unregulated economy. For stricter regulation with smaller values of the
re-use parameter, agent 1 gains and agent 2 loses welfare. However, after compensation of agent 2,
the net effect on agent 1 remains a positive welfare change.
Two counteracting economic forces are at play here. First, the ability to re-use allows for more
risk-sharing in the economy. This effect is generally beneficial for welfare given the agents’ het-
erogeneity in risk aversion. Second, the heterogeneity in agents’ beliefs triggers agents to build up
leveraged positions beyond what is needed to optimally share risks. As the ability to re-use collateral
allows agents to build up this leverage, limiting re-use has the potential to steer agents’ choices closer
to socially optimal levels.
To demonstrate these two opposing economic forces, we disentangle the effects of heterogeneous
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Figure VIII: Welfare changes as a function of the re-use parameter
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The figure shows the welfare changes for both agents in response to a regulatory change in the re-use parameter from
κ = 1 to the level of κ on the horizontal axis. The benchmark economy for the comparison is an unregulated economy
in a time period when agent 1’s wealth is equal to the mean of the ergodic distribution; also, the economy enters state
3 in the subsequent period.
risk aversion and heterogeneous beliefs in two separate experiments. In the first experiment, we set
the risk aversion of both agents to 3 and maintain their heterogeneous beliefs. Figure IX plots the
individual welfare changes for the two agents in this experiment. Both agents realize substantial
welfare gains in response to re-use regulation. In fact, the welfare-maximizing policy (according
to the objective beliefs) is a policy prohibiting re-use. This result is not surprising. The agents
have heterogeneous beliefs, which are both incorrect. Agent 1 is too optimistic and agent 2 is too
pessimistic compared to the objective (and correct) beliefs. The availability of free re-use enables
the agents to build up leveraged positions that are suboptimal (according to the objective beliefs).
And so strict re-use regulation leads to a Pareto improvement. We also note that the welfare gain
of agent 2, after compensation of agent 1, shows strong concavity for κ ∈ [0, 0.6].
In a second experiment, we set the beliefs of both agents to the objective beliefs and maintain
their original levels of risk aversion. Figure X plots the individual welfare changes for the two agents
in this experiment. Due to their heterogeneous levels of risk aversion but identical objective beliefs,
the agents trade solely for the purpose of risk-sharing. A decrease of the re-use parameter below 60%
restricts the agents’ ability to trade and decreases the welfare of the more risk-averse agent 2. While
the less risk-averse agent 1 gains welfare for some intermediate values of κ, he also loses welfare once
the re-use parameter falls below 30%. The aggregate welfare effect is never positive. Moreover, we
find that the welfare of agent 2 after compensation of agent 1 is very much linearly increasing in the
re-use limit for κ ∈ [0, 0.6].
In sum, for κ ∈ [0, 0.6], we observe a concave decreasing welfare of agent 2 after compensation
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Figure IX: Welfare changes as a function of the re-use parameter
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The graph shows welfare changes for the two agents in response to a regulatory change in the re-use parameter
from κ = 1 to the level of κ on the horizontal axis.. Both agents have identical risk aversion of 3 and the original
heterogeneous beliefs.
Figure X: Welfare changes as a function of the re-use parameter
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The graph shows welfare changes for the two agents in response to a regulatory change in the re-use parameter
from κ = 1 to the level of κ on the horizontal axis. Both agents have identical objective beliefs and the original
heterogeneous levels of risk aversion.
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of agent 1 in the first experiment and a linear increasing welfare of agent 2 after compensation of
agent 1 in the second experiment. Combining these insights, it is not surprising to find the hump-
shaped impact of the re-use limit on welfare in the original setting with heterogeneous beliefs and
heterogeneous risk aversion.
5.1.2 A full welfare analysis
Until now we have measured welfare gains using the agents’ value functions under objective beliefs.
We may question this choice of metric since the agents make their decisions under different beliefs
and so we may want to examine welfare under different beliefs as well. Also, perhaps the objective
beliefs in the welfare measure are the reason for the interior maxima. In our second robustness check,
we examine welfare changes under four alternative sets of beliefs. Two natural alternatives are the
individual beliefs of the two agents. In addition, we consider beliefs that are the average of one of
the agent’s beliefs and the objective beliefs. For each of these four alternatives, we compute again
the peak of the welfare of agent 2 after compensation of agent 1.
Table III reports the results of this robustness check. The table reports the location of the peak
Table III: Sensitivity to choice of the beliefs used to evaluate welfare
agent 1 average 1 benchmark average 2 agent 2
50 (2.79) 47.5 (3.29) 45 (3.33) 37.5 (3.24) 37.5 (2.91)
The table reports the location of the peak of the welfare function in terms of the re-use limit κ (in percent) as well
as the change in welfare (in percent) for agent 2 after compensation of agent 1 at this location (in parentheses) for
our economic model for the agents’ value functions under different beliefs. The entry under “benchmark” denotes the
welfare change under objective beliefs, the entry under “average 1” denotes the welfare change for beliefs that are the
average of agent 1’s and the objective beliefs, and so on.
of the welfare function in terms of the re-use limit κ (in percent) as well as the change in welfare (in
percent) for agent 2 after compensation of agent 1 at the peak (in parentheses). The entry under
“benchmark” denotes the results under objective beliefs, the entry under “average 1” denotes the
results for beliefs that are the average of agent 1’s and the objective beliefs, and so on. For all
five beliefs, the welfare measure has an interior maximum. Both the locations of the peak and the
accompanying maximal welfare gains change only slightly in response to changes in the beliefs.
5.2 A calibration with cursed agents
The presence of an interior welfare-maximizing re-use level is a surprising and important prediction
of our asset-pricing model. The interested reader may, therefore, wonder whether this outcome
holds up to changes in the model set-up or the welfare measure. To address this question, we now
consider a model with cursed agents. Until now our analysis has rested on the key assumption
that the two agents have different and wrong beliefs at all times. Agent 1 is always optimistic and
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agent 2 is always pessimistic relative to the objective state probabilities. This obviously does not fit
the narrative that agents receive signals every period and irrationally act on these signals without
considering other agents’ actions. We now relax this strong assumption and allow for temporary
agreement between the two agents. Specifically, there are two belief regimes, which have the same
unconditional probability of 0.5, and which each persist with a probability of pir. In the first regime,
called the agreement regime, both agents’ beliefs are just the objective probabilities. The second
regime, called the disagreement regime, is the heterogeneous-beliefs set-up of our benchmark analysis
with agent 1 (2) being optimistic (pessimistic).
Recall that in our benchmark analysis, the disagreement parameters had the value δd = δn = 0.4,
see Section 3.5. We now also consider a smaller value of δd = δn = 0.2. Table IV reports the
results of this robustness check13 for three different values of the persistence probability pir. Note
that the benchmark economy is given by the case pir = 1 and δd = δn = 0.4. The table reports the
location of the peak of the welfare function in terms of the re-use limit κ (in percent) as well as the
change in welfare (in percent) for agent 2 after compensation of agent 1 at the peak (in parentheses).
The interior welfare-maximizing re-use level is qualitatively robust. In all six cases, the welfare of
Table IV: Sensitivity to level of disagreement and persistence in belief regime
persistence pir (in %) 100 90 50
disagreement δd = δn = 0.4 45 (3.33) 45 (1.20) 50 (1.14)
disagreement δd = δn = 0.2 50 (0.60) 50 (0.21) 52.5 (0.21)
The table reports the location of the peak of the welfare function in terms of the re-use limit κ (in percent) as well
as the change in welfare (in percent) for agent 2 after compensation of agent 1 at the peak (in parentheses) for our
economic model for different values of the disagreement parameter δd = δn and the persistence parameter pir (in
percent).
agent 2 after compensation of agent 1 has an interior maximum. Not surprisingly, a lower level of
disagreement leads to smaller maximal welfare gains. Similarly, lower levels of the persistence pir of
the belief regimes also result in smaller maximal amounts of welfare gains. The results further reveal
that the location of the peak shifts to slightly higher values of the re-use limit κ, compared to the
benchmark case.
6 Conclusion
Publicly available data on collateral re-use activity of globally active banks indicates that collateral
re-use plays an important role in financial markets. While market participants have stressed the im-
portance of re-use of collateral as a source of funding and market liquidity more generally, regulators
13For consistency with our benchmark analysis, we assume again that a change of the re-use policy is enacted when the
wealth distribution in the economy is at its mean level and the economy enters the normal state of the disagreement
regime. This assumption ensures comparability of the results to those of the benchmark economy.
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and supervisors have raised various concerns about this market practice. The use of the same secu-
rity as underlying collateral for different transactions increases the sum of exposures in the financial
system and, and as result, creates leverage across the intermediation chain. To provide informa-
tion for the policy discussion on whether collateral re-use should be permitted on financial markets,
and if so, to what degree, it is clearly important to develop a model framework to understand the
(qualitative) implications of collateral re-use on financial market outcomes and welfare.
In this paper, we have developed a calibrated, infinite-horizon asset-pricing model with hetero-
geneous agents that allows us to assess the qualitative implications of re-use on financial market
leverage, volatility, and welfare. In our model, the ability of agents to re-use frees up collateral that
can be used to back more transactions. Through this channel, re-use of collateral contributes to the
build-up of leverage in the financial system and is found to significantly increase volatility in financial
markets. We have shown that the limits on the amount of collateral that agents may re-use reduces
financial market volatility; in fact, the tighter the limits the lower the volatility. While the effect
of re-use limits on volatility is monotone, the impact on welfare is not. In the model, allowing for
some re-use can improve welfare as it enables agents to more effectively share risks. Allowing re-use
beyond intermediate levels, however, can lead to excessive leverage and lower welfare. In conclusion,
the analysis in this paper provides a rationale for limiting, yet not banning, re-use in financial markets.
Appendix
A Additional Proofs
We show that the agents’ utility maximization problem is well defined. In particular, we prove that
the collateral and lower-bound constraints do not exclude reasonable portfolios.
The collateral constraint (1) only needs to hold for θh(st) < 0. We now show that it is redundant
for θh(st) ≥ 0. Note that (1) is equivalent to
θh(st) ≥ −(1−ms(s
t))p(st)φh(st)
q(st)
.
If θh(st) ≥ 0 and φh(st) ≥ 0, then the constraint holds since ms(st) ≤ 1. If φh(st) < 0, the constraint
cannot be binding, since in that case the collateral constraint (2) imposes the tighter constraint
θh(st) ≥ −p(s
t)φh(st)
(1−ml(st))q(st)
for all ms(s
t),ml(s
t) < 1.
The collateral constraint (2) only needs to hold for φh(st) < 0. We now show that it is redundant
for φh(st) ≥ 0. Note that (2) is equivalent to
φh(st) ≥ −(1−ml(s
t))q(st)θh(st)
p(st)
.
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If θh(st) ≥ 0 and φh(st) ≥ 0, then the constraint holds since ms(st) ≤ 1. If θh(st) < 0, the constraint
cannot be binding, since in that case the collateral constraint (1) imposes the tighter constraint
θh(st) ≥ −q(s
t)θh(st)
(1−ms(st))p(st)
for all ms(s
t),ml(s
t) < 1.
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